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Abstract 
     Using Japan’s prefecture-level panel data from 1989-2001, this paper examines 
the influence of the social norm on a person’s smoking behavior when the 
complementary relationship between smoking and drinking is taken into account. The 
key findings through a dynamic panel model controlling for unobserved 
prefecture-specific fixed effects are as follows: (1) Influence from others is stronger 
when people live more closely and cohesively. A tightly knit society results in a 
reduction of smoking through smoking-related interaction. (2) Smoking and drinking 
have a complementary relationship: greater initial consumption of alcohol results in 
larger consumption of cigarettes. (3) The complementary relationship between 
smoking and dinking is attenuated if the cost of committing the annoying conduct (i.e., 
smoking) is high.  
  Overall, this empirical study provides evidence that the psychological effect of the 
presence of surrounding people has a direct significant effect upon smoking behavior 
and, furthermore, that it attenuates the complementary relationship between smoking 
and drinking, thereby reducing cigarette consumption. These results indicate that not 
only formal rules but also tacitly formed informal norms are effective deterrents to 
smoking.  
 
JEL classification: I10; I12; Z10 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally acknowledged that Japan’s per capita cigarette consumption and 
smoking rate has been remarkably high among major industrialized nations (World 
Bank, 1999). However, in Japan, some literature has pointed out that compared with 
other industrialized nations, the government did not sufficiently make an effort to 
raise public awareness about the health hazards of smoking (Yorozu and Zhou, 2002; 
Luo et al., 2003)1. For instance, Yorozu and Zhou (2002) refer to the absence of 
antismoking ordinances and regulations and the lack of dissemination of information 
about the health hazards of smoking. Nonetheless, the consumption of cigarettes has 
declined gradually in Japan. Thus, given that the formal rules and laws enacted by the 
government were not sufficiently effective in reducing cigarette consumption, there 
should be other mechanisms involved in the control of smoking which has lead to a 
reduction of cigarette consumption.  
A person innately does not pay much attention to which side of the road they 
drive on, and thus they would normally choose to simply drive on the same side as 
everyone else. This phenomenon shows an aspect of human nature that relates to 
social existence. The influence of the attitude and conduct of others on a person’s 
behavior seems apparent among neighbors and colleagues in schools and workplaces 
(Beker and Murphy, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Crane, 1991; Evans et al., 1992; 
Gaviria and Rapahel, 2001; Glaeser et al., 1996; Manski, 1993). The interactive 
mechanism above also applies to a person’s choice of demand behavior. What others 
consume stimulates a person’s demand for it as well. That is to say, the more popular 
goods are, the more people want them. Consequently, interactions among people 
through conversations and daily life may affect aggregated demand behavior toward 
goods such as cigarettes (Powell et al., 2005). When this interactive mechanism is 
considered, as Coleman (1990) pointed out, actors harmed by an action that benefits 
the actor in control of the action experience negative externalities, as exemplified by 
nonsmokers sitting near a smoker. The problem for nonsmokers, therefore, is how to 
limit such actions taken by smokers.  
Compared with Europe or North America, in general the smoking prevalence of 
females is remarkably lower than that of males in the Asian nations of Japan, Korea, 
Thailand, and Singapore. For example, the smoking prevalences of males and females 
in the United States are 27.7% and 22.5 %, respectively. On the other hand, those of 
                                                   
1 The situation in Korea is similar (Kim and Seldon, 2004).  Other existing work 
examining smoking behavior in Asia includes Japan (Haden, 1990) and China 
(Yuanliang and Zongyi, 2005). 
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Japan are 59.0 % and 14.8 %, respectively (Worldbank, 1999). These data imply that as 
a whole the smoking prevalence of Japan is higher than that of the United States, 
although that of females is distinctly lower in Japan than in the United States. Japan 
ratified its “Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women” in 1979 at the United Nations General Assembly2. Consequently, females 
have risen in social standing and therefore have a larger influence on the social lives of 
the Japanese. With regard to smoking, most females in Japan are non-smokers who 
dislike smoking behavior. As the social status of females has risen, the anti-smoking 
atmosphere has become more prevalent3. Such an atmosphere also seems to shape the 
general anti-smoking social norm in Japan. 
  If one smokes in a public place and the surrounding people indicate their 
annoyance against him, then the person may feel embarrassed and thereby generate 
the psychological cost of committing the impolite behavior of smoking. The 
psychological cost of smoking depends on anti-smoking social norms, which are shaped 
by local interactions (Funk, 2005). Furthermore, the apprehension of bad behavior 
such as crime or smoking depends on the watchfulness of citizens (Huck and Kosfeld, 
2007). Neighborhood watch efforts are likely to be more effective if the community 
members have closer relationships. Accordingly, assuming that neighborhood watch 
and psychological cost are complementary and that the majority of a community’s 
members consist of nonsmokers, then the social norm that bans community members 
from smoking will be stronger in a more cohesive community. In the long run, the 
entire community will come to ostracize those who break such informal rules, such as 
smokers (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999). I believe that informal rules such as social 
norms are the key determinants of the attitudes of smokers in Japan. This is why, in 
this study, I pay particular attention to the role of social norms in the regulation of 
smoker attitudes and thus include the proxy variables of social disorganization4.  
      The empirical studies of Dee (1999) and Gruber et al. (2003) provide evidence of 
a robust complementarity between cigarettes and alcohol5 . To put it differently, 
reductions in drinking are associated with a lower prevalence of smoking. Such a 
                                                   
2 See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 
3 Due to limitations of data, the effect of females on cigarette consumption is not 
directly estimated in this research. 
4 The cohesiveness of society has another aspect as well.  According to Putnam (2000), 
social networks built in a cohesive society may reinforce healthy norms, and socially 
isolated people are more likely to smoke or engage in various health damaging 
behaviors. 
5 Recently, Arcidacono et al. (2007) also investigated the relationship between smoking 
and drinking. 
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complementarity seems to be affected by the informal social norm created through the 
watchfulness of the neighborhood or colleagues at work. The anti-smoking social norm 
appears to attenuate the complementarity between smoking and drinking. 
Nevertheless, the empirical links between social norms and complementary goods has 
yet to be considered in the literature. Therefore, the object of this paper is to explore 
such links using the panel data of Japan from 47 Japanese prefectures for the years 
1989-2001 and controlling for unobservable fixed effects. The contribution of this paper 
is a combined analysis of the importance of the social norm and complementary goods 
on smoking behavior. 
     This paper also contributes to the cigarette demand literature by examining the 
determinants of smoking incorporating both the direct and indirect effects of the social 
norm (via reduction of the complementarity of alcohol consumption) on smoking 
behavior. The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 surveys cigarette 
consumption in Japan and advances a testable hypothesis. Section 3 presents the 
simple econometric framework. Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. The 
final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Review of cigarette consumption in Japan 
2.1. Review 
   I begin this section by studying the figures that outline the current state of 
smoking in Japan. A cursory examination of Figure 1, which demonstrates the 
transition of per capita consumption of cigarettes in Japan, suggests that consumption 
declined gradually over time until 19966 . Subsequently, Figure 2 illustrates the 
average per capita consumption of cigarettes by prefecture for both high alcohol 
consumption and low consumption groups, which are equally divided by the initial 
year’s alcohol consumption7. Figure 2 reveals that the consumption of cigarettes by the 
high alcohol consumption group is obviously higher than that of the low alcohol 
consumption group. Monthly expenditures of cigarettes declined from 1500 yen (in 
1988) to 1100 yen (after 1996) in the high alcohol consumption group, whereas it 
declined from 1100 yen (in 1988) to 950 yen (after 1996) in the low alcohol consumption 
group. Thus the reduction in cigarette expenditures was approximately 400 yen for the 
high alcohol consumption group but only 150 yen for the low alcohol consumption 
group, indicating a difference in cigarette consumption between these two groups. 
                                                   
6 The evolution of cigarette consumption is unchanged even when expenditures on 
cigarettes are divided by the unit price of cigarettes. That is, consumption had been in 
decline until 1996, even when the unit price change is taken into account. 
7 The initial year is defined as 1989. 
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Furthermore, the consumption of alcohol was positively associated with that of 
cigarettes, and the decrease in cigarette consumption was more evident in the high 
alcohol consumption group than in the low consumption group.  
The relationship between cigarette and alcohol consumption is shown in Figure 
3, in which alcohol and cigarette consumption are represented in the horizontal and 
the vertical axis, respectively. Alcohol and cigarette consumption per year are 
measured in millions of yen. I used their log forms to create the figures. Furthermore, 
Figures 3 a) and 3 b) show the high and low alcohol consumption groups, respectively, 
which are divided in the same manner used in Figure 2. As I explain later, the data 
comprises panel data, consisting of 47 prefectures and spanning 13 years. There were a 
total of 611 observations, which were then divided into the high alcohol consumption 
group (312 observations) and the low alcohol consumption group (299 observations). 
From these figures it can be seen that the sample regression line in Figure 3a) is 
steeper than that in Figure 3 b). That is, a positive relationship is observed more 
clearly in Figure 3 a) than in Figure 3 b), indicating that the complementarity between 
drinking and smoking is more obvious if the consumption of alcohol is higher.   
     To sum up the evidence presented above, smoking is associated more positively 
with drinking despite the fact that their complementarity declines more rapidly in the 
areas where the consumption of alcohol is higher. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis 
      As suggested earlier, the per capita cigarette consumption in Japan has 
dominated industrialized nations in recent years. However, there is a remarkable 
difference in the smoking prevalences of males and females, which are about 60 % and 
15 %, respectively (World bank, 1999). A growing body of literature suggests that social 
interaction mechanisms may be crucial determinants of behavior. It has been asserted 
that an increase in the prevalence of a given behavior at the peer level may lead to an 
increased probability of such behavior at the individual level (Manski, 1993; Becker, 
1996; Becker and Murphy, 2000; Glaeser et al., 1996). Assuming that society consists 
mainly of males in Japan, there may be a social interaction mechanism that enhances 
the prevalence of smoking since the majority of people in the society are smokers. 
Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that females have a relatively low social position in 
Japan. Under such circumstances, it is generally believed to be merely a matter of 
etiquette in Japan to ask another person sitting beside one for permission to smoke 
(Yorozu and Zhou, 2002).  
       However, in recent years, the social position of females has improved and 
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females have become influential in the modern society of Japan. This change reflects 
the Equal Employment Opportunities Law for Men and Women, which was enacted in 
1985 in order to improve the employment opportunities of females. In the process of 
their rise in social position, females tend to increase their influence on modern social 
behaviors such as smoking at workplaces and accelerate the social norm of “not 
smoking for the sake of nonsmokers” through smoking-related interaction8. The higher 
the psychological cost, the stronger the nonsmoking norm becomes. The strength of 
nonsmoking norms plays a critical role in deterring members of a society from smoking. 
In short, as the social standing of females improves, the nonsmoking social norm 
emerges and leads to decreases in cigarette consumption. Informal norm enforcement 
among interacting male and female members of society tends to be stronger and more 
effective if the members communicate more cohesively and closely (Putnam, 2000). 
Accordingly, I raise the following Hypothesis 1 concerning the effect of social norms on 
smoking.  
 
Hypothesis 1: A tightly knit society can achieve a reduction in smoking through 
smoking-related interaction.  
 
Dee (1999) presents evidence of the complementarity of drinking and smoking 
in line with the findings shown in the figures presented in the previous subsection. In 
addition to their complementarity, both cigarettes and alcohol are considered addictive 
goods. Hence, the initial consumption of alcohol is positively associated with the 
subsequent consumption of cigarettes9. Accordingly, I advance the following empirical 
Hypothesis 2. 
. 
Hypothesis 2: Greater consumption of alcohol in the past results in greater current 
consumption of alcohol, eventually leading to greater current consumption of 
cigarettes.  
 
The psychological cost of committing an impolite behavior comes from the 
watchfulness of the neighborhood or colleagues at a workplace. On the condition that 
                                                   
8 Smoking related interactions are supposed as follows: Females tend to ask smokers 
at work not to smoke. When females are employed equal numbers to males, then 
smokers are more likely to be informed that their smoke bothers someone at work.   
9 From a medical and health science point of view, if people can become addicted to 
both types of products, then a cure should be sought for both. Hence, addictiveness 
should be regarded as a kind of disease rather than simply a habit. 
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the cost rises, smokers drink but are less likely to smoke at a party where nonsmokers 
are present, even if smokers would like to jointly consume cigarettes and alcohol. This 
psychological cost is expected to have an influence not only directly on smoking but 
also indirectly on its complementarity. As a consequence, I postulate Hypothesis 3 with 
respect to the effects of the informal social norm upon smoking. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The complementarity between smoking and drinking is attenuated if the 
cost of committing the annoying conduct of smoking is high. 
 
3 Model 
3.1. Data 
 
     Except for cigarette price, data used in the regression estimation as independent 
variables are collected from Asahi Shinbunsha (various years). The price data are 
obtained from the Japan Statistical Yearbook (various years) published by the 
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication. The 
structure of the data is panel, consisting of 47 prefectures and spanning 13 years (1989 
- 2001). The raw data set includes various prefecture-level data on various variables. 
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the regression 
estimation.  
 
3.2. Econometric Framework 
To test the hypotheses raised in the previous section, first I examine whether 
the social norm reduced the current cigarette consumption directly. Second, I examine 
how the social norm attenuates the complementarity of alcohol and cigarette 
consumption. 
Following Becker and Murphy (2000), the estimated function takes the 
following myopic addiction form10: 
 
CIGA it=  1CIGAit-1  + 2PRICit  + 3DENSit  + 4SN1it + 5SN2it+ 6DSN1it + 
7DSN2it+8ALCOL it +9INCOMit +10SERVICit +11CARit +12POPit t 
+ i +uit , 
where CIGA it represents the dependent variable in prefecture i and year t. ’s 
                                                   
10 The focus of this paper is not on rational addictive behavior.  I thus used the 
myopic function form. Nonetheless, when the rational addiction model is employed, the 
results of estimation are unchanged. 
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represents the regression parameters. In this estimation, as the main stress does not 
fall on the rational addictive behavior, I hypothesized that current cigarette 
consumption depends on past consumption but not future consumption. If the myopic 
addictive behavior holds, then the expected signs of the lagged CIGA and PRIC become 
positive and negative, respectively11. 
t, iti u,  represent the unobservable specific effects in the t th year (a fixed effect 
time vector), the individual effects of i ’s prefecture (a fixed effects prefecture vector) 
and an error term, t represents the year specific effects and i  holds the 
time invariant feature, while u is an error term. The structure of the data set used in 
this study is panel, and the independent variables include a lagged dependent variable. 
To address potential endogenous problems with the lagged independent variable, I 
carry out dynamic panel estimation developed by Arellano-bond (Baltagi, 2005), as 
dynamic panel models allow past realizations of the dependent variable to affect its 
current level. In addition, special attention must be paid to the omitted variable bias 
stemming from unobservable individual specific effects. This can be also controlled for 
by means of dynamic panel estimation. Year dummies were also incorporated to 
t, which represents the conditional and structural changes at the macro level 
that could affect cigarette consumption. 
 
3.3. Proxies for social norms 
 Nonsmokers would suffer seriously from the smoking of surrounding people if 
they lived in a densely populated area since the externality of smoking is strong and 
directly affects others. Nonsmokers have a tendency to request that smokers not 
smoke or to express their annoyance with the smoking behavior. This is why the 
expected signs of DENS representing the density of the population measured by the 
population per km2 are negative.  
 I now proceed to characterize the social norm that captures the informal social 
pressure on smokers from nonsmokers12. The cost of annoying others depends on the 
                                                   
11 Although the price measure is a single nationwide uniform cigarette price in Japan, 
the deflator is different among prefectures. The cigarette price can be deflated by the 
consumer price index, and therefore the relative cigarette price varies across 
prefectures. 
12 The proxies of social norms are constructed based on the prefecture-level aggregated 
data. It should be noted that prefecture may not be adequate as the unit of analysis 
because social norms are formed through interpersonal interaction in neighborhoods 
and workplaces. Thus, attention should be paid to the possible limitations of the data. 
Future studies will need to incorporate micro data to examine the effects of social 
norms.  
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social norms, which are shaped by local interactions (Funk, 2005). As pointed out by 
Jacobs (1969), in urban areas, face-to-face communication is easier, resulting in 
economic benefits. This suggests that interpersonal interactions are more frequent in 
denser areas because the distances among people are shorter, allowing social norms to 
form. Individuals are more apt to smoke due to the decrease in the expected cost of 
annoying surrounding people such as community members or workplace colleagues if 
the community is disorganized and social norms are weak. According to the view of 
Putnam (2000), social disorganization can be regarded as the engine of impolite 
behavior. Such disorganization undermines the social norms and marks urban areas 
where population turnover is high, one’s neighbors are anonymous, and local 
organization is rare. The degree to which one is integrated into one’s community 
depends upon the community’s condition. To borrow an argument of Putnam (2000), 
frequent movers have weaker ties within the community, and so mobile communities 
seem to have less interactivity among neighbors than more stable communities. To put 
it differently, the more mobile a community is, the weaker the connectedness within it 
becomes. Hence, DSN 1 and DSN2, denoting the number of population turnovers 
within a prefecture and the number of immigrants from other prefectures, respectively, 
can be considered as proxies for the decay of social norms13 . Accordingly, these 
coefficients are predicted to take a positive sign. 
 The following independent variables are used as proxies of the social norm. In 
traditional Japanese daily life, public baths were used by community members who, 
apart from the wealthy, ordinarily lived in houses without a private bath. Through the 
use of such baths, people could get acquainted with neighbors and generate social 
networks. In modern Japan, most residences have their own baths, and people are 
therefore more likely to take a bath at home. However, a new type of public bath 
featuring more deluxe baths and saunas has recently developed, and these are used by 
all sectors of society, thus providing a place to meet neighbors and form social networks. 
The community center can be also considered as a place where people interact closely 
and enhance the cohesiveness among community members. Closely-knit networks 
formed through interpersonal interactions are thought to ostracize their members if 
they are considered to be against the informal rules that exist within the network 
(Hayami, 2001). The higher the cost of suffering from ostracism, the more tightly the 
                                                   
13 In previous studies (e.g., Yamamura, 2008a; 2008b; 2010), the number of population 
turnovers within a prefecture and the number of immigrants from other prefectures 
are also used as proxies of social norms in prefectural-level data. These studies provide 
evidence that these social norm proxies have significant influences on the demands for 
lawyers, driving mannerisms, and voting behavior.  
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network is knitted (Greif, 1993; 1994). The degree of the cost of suffering from 
ostracism can therefore be considered a measure of the strength of social norms. 
Therefore, the number of public baths and community centers, represented as SN1 as 
SN2, respectively, where people can contact neighbors and deter them from annoying 
the others surrounding them, can thus also serve as a proxy for social norms14. 
Therefore, I expect the signs of SN1 and SN2 to be negative. 
 
3.4. Control variables 
In addition to social norms, I also focus on the effects of drinking15 following 
the argument of Dee (1999) that the consumption of alcohol and cigarettes might 
constitute an important case as these products are complementary. Thus, the ALCOL 
standing for alcohol consumption is expected to take a positive sign16. 
The cost of smoking is not only psychological but also economic. In the 
workplace, if ones customers, business partners, or counterparts dislike smoking, then 
a smoker cannot build good relationships with them, and as a result, team 
performance in the workplace is lowered. In particular, the cost of smoking appears to 
be high in the service sector, as employees tend to work within a locked room and can 
suffer more health damage from smoking. Following the enactment of a restrictive 
smoking policy (Gottlieb et al., 1990; William et al., 1999), informal rules of preventing 
smoking should also form naturally and necessarily become effective. Hence, SERVI, 
denoting the number of people employed in the service sector, would take a negative 
sign. Similarly, because the space inside vehicles is closed, people riding inside vehicles 
should be more sensitive to smoking and the likelihood of more serious damage to their 
health from its effects. The sign of CAR, which represents the number of vehicles, is 
expected to be negative. 
 
3.5. Interaction terms with alcohol 
In the subsequent estimation, I incorporate the additional cross-products of 
                                                   
14 Yamamura (2009) considered the number of public baths and the number of 
community centers as proxies of social norms by using prefectural level data, and 
found that these variables were negatively associated with the number of crimes 
committed. 
15 The case Dee (1999) presents is of teenage smoking and drinking. I conjecture that 
this relationship holds in not only teens but also in other generations. 
16 It should be noted that the price of alcohol must be used as the explanatory variable 
in order to more precisely examine the complementarity.  However, I found difficulty 
in measuring the price of alcohol since there are a number of kinds of alcohol, such as 
beer, whiskey and wine.  
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ALCOLit and some dependent variables as follows: DENSit*ALCOLit, SN1it*ALCOLit, 
SN2it*ALCOLit, DSN1it*ALCOLit, and DSN2it*ALCOLit. As stated previously in 
Hypotheis 3, the complementarity between smoking and drinking becomes weaker 
when the cohesiveness of a tightly knit community leads to raising the psychological 
cost of smoking. If this holds, then the expected signs of DENSit*ALCOLit, 
SN1it*ALCOLit,, and SN2it*ALCOLit become negative. On the other hand, 
DSN1it*ALCOLit and DSN1it*ALCOLit are expected to take a positive sign.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Basic results 
    Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the dynamic panel estimations. 
Estimations were conducted using not only the whole sample shown in (1) and (4), but 
also the high alcohol consumption prefectures in columns (2) and (5) and the low 
alcohol consumption prefectures in (3) and (6). Information derived from the 
estimations of splitting samples can be of great use for comparing the differences of 
social norm effects on smoking behavior between the two groups. Looking at the second 
row from the bottom of Tables 2 and 3 reveals that there is no second-order serial 
correlation for disturbances of the first-differenced equation for any of the dynamic 
panel (GMM) estimations. Therefore, Arellano-Bond type GMM estimators are 
consistent. 
    From the results of columns (1) and (4), it can be seen that CIGA and PRIC 
take positive and negative signs, respectively, which is in line with the myopic 
addiction model. Turning to the key variables of this research, most of the proxies for 
the social norm or the decay of the social norm such as DENS, SN1, SN2, DSN1, and 
DSN2, take the predicted signs while being statistically significant, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. ALCOHOL, SERVI, and CAR also take the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. INCOM takes a negative sign, implying that cigarettes are 
inferior goods. This finding is contrary to that of the existing literature (Haden, 1990; 
Yorozu and Zhou, 2002). The reason why cigarettes become inferior goods is likely due 
to the emergence of substitute goods in the process of the economic development in 
Japan. These results strongly support my prediction that the social norm plays an 
important role in the decrease of cigarette consumption.  
Next, let us compare the results of the high and low alcohol consumption groups. 
In particular, I will focus upon columns (2) and (3), where all explanatory variables are 
included. In column (2), whereas the coefficients of DENS and SN1 take negative signs, 
those of DSN1 and DSN2 take positive signs, and they are all statistically significant 
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with the exception of DENS and SN1. The fact that the coefficient of ALCOL takes the 
expected positive sign implies that the complementarity of dinking and smoking is 
valid. On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that in column (3) most of the 
proxies for the social norm or the decay of the social norm do not take the predicted 
signs, and none of them are statistically significant. Furthermore, contrary to the 
expected result, the coefficient sign of ALCOL is negative. When I compare the results 
of columns (5) and (6) in the alternative specification, the results are unchanged. 
Considering Figure 2 and Table 2 together, the social norm effects on smoking depend 
upon the initial consumption of alcohol, which is positively associated with the initial 
consumption of cigarettes. The effects of antismoking norms declined as the initial 
consumption of smoking and drinking fell, presumably because the smaller the 
externality from smoking, the less aggressive nonsmoker attitudes toward smokers 
became, which is in line with previously published results finding that the proportion 
of nonsmokers that suggested to smokers that they quit smoking decreased after the 
implementation of restrictive smoking policies in the United States. (Gottlieb et al., 
1990). Another likely reason for the decrease in the effectiveness of antismoking norms 
is that when the number of places where people are allowed to smoke decreases, there 
are fewer opportunities for nonsmokers to express their opinions of annoyance to 
smokers. In short, these results can be interpreted to mean the following. (1) Social 
norms have a tremendous effect on smoking when the consumption of alcohol is high, 
but not when it is low. (2) The degree of current consumption of cigarettes depends 
upon the initial consumption of alcohol, thus confirming Hypothesis 2.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 3, where the problem of 
simultaneous consumption between alcohol and cigarettes is controlled for by using 
the lagged value of ALCOL. Compared with the results shown in Table 2, I found that, 
as a whole, these results were no different, and therefore it can be concluded that both 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 were supported.  
 
4.2. The impact of norms on complementarity 
  Switching now to the interaction terms of ALCOLt-1 and the proxy variables for 
the social norm or its decay, the results are shown in Table 4 and Table 5. In columns 
(2) and (4) of both tables, population rates of 20-24, 25-39, and over 64 are used as 
additional instruments in order to control for endogeneity bias. As the focus of this 
study is on the impact of the social norm on the complementarity of smoking and 
dinking, it can be seen from Table 4 that in all estimations, as expected, the signs of 
DENSit*ALCOLit are negative while those of DSN1it*ALCOLit and DSN2it*ALCOLit 
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are positive and statistically significant with the exception of DSN2it*ALCOLit17 in 
column (3). As for SN1it*ALCOLit, its coefficient signs are not stable although it is 
statistically insignificant in all estimations. With respect to SN2it*ALCOLit, its 
coefficients take the predicted negative signs and are statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (4) at the 1 % level. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, SERVI and CAR take 
significant negative signs, conforming to the expectations.  
Turning to the results of the interaction terms of the lagged ALCOL used to 
eliminate the problem of simultaneous alcohol consumption, the results in Table 5 
show that the dynamic panel estimation is suitable because there is no second-order 
serial correlation for disturbances of the first-differenced equation for all estimations18. 
Taken as a whole, the results after controlling for the endogeneity of alcohol 
consumption are the same as those shown in Table 4, and therefore are robust to 
alternative specifications. My interpretation of the results drawn from Tables 4 and 5 
is consistent with the prediction described earlier and supports Hypothesis 3.  
        Up to this point I have presented the various estimated results of this study. 
Summing them up, I arrive at the conclusion that the estimation results examined in 
this section are consistent and reasonably support Hypotheses 1 to 3 raised in the 
preceding section.  
 
5. Conclusion 
      The consumption of cigarettes is considered to be influenced by the informal 
social norm and social interaction. Therefore, the mechanisms related to the social 
norm and social interaction seem to be more influential among industrialized countries, 
and especially in Japan since it is a relatively homogeneous society. However, 
researchers have heretofore not paid attention to this relationship, and therefore little 
is known about the effect of the social norm on smoking behavior.  
The key findings through a dynamic panel model controlling for unobserved 
fixed effects are as follows:  
(1) Influence from others is stronger when people live more closely and cohesively 
together. Thus, a tightly knit society can help to create a reduction of smoking through 
smoking-related interaction.  
(2) Smoking and drinking have a complementary relationship; greater initial 
consumption of alcohol results in greater consumption of cigarettes.  
                                                   
17 It must be noted that there is a second-order serial correlation for disturbances of 
the first-differenced equation in columns (3) and (4). 
18 The causality of smoking and drinking is not evident, and thus the simultaneous 
problem arises.   
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(3) Complementarity between smoking and drinking is attenuated if the cost of 
committing the annoying conduct (i.e., smoking) is high.  
Summing up the evidence presented here, overall this empirical study provides 
evidence that the high psychological cost caused by those surrounding smokers has a 
direct significant effect upon smoking behavior and, furthermore, that it attenuate the 
complementarity between smoking and drinking, thereby reducing cigarette 
consumption. I found that this research helps to explain one aspect of human nature 
related to social existence. The influence of the attitude of others on a person’s 
behavior seems apparent. The findings derived from the current investigation using 
regression analysis can further bridge the complementary relationship between social 
norms and smoking behavior, and as such they are of value to researchers.  
 Social norms are thought to be formed through the interpersonal interactions 
among people in close proximity. This paper used prefecture-level aggregated data, but 
due to limitations inherent in such data, the effects of social norms could not be 
investigated as accurately as this inquiry requires. Therefore, for more precise 
estimation, it is necessary to use micro-level data to better analyze the effects of social 
norms; we intend to incorporate such date in our future work. Moreover, my chief 
argument in this paper is in part based on the critical assumption that as the social 
position of females improved, it more strongly affected smoking behavior. Nevertheless, 
it is not clear whether this assumption is valid. A future direction for this study will be 
to examine how the improvement of the social position of females has an influence on 
smoking behavior and thereby helps reduce the consumption of cigarettes in Japan.  
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Fig 1. Monthly household expenditures on cigarettes.  
 
Note: Data source: Minryoku, edited by Asahi Shinbunsha. 
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Fig 2. Monthly household expenditures on cigarettes for high alcohol consumption and 
low alcohol consumption areas. 
 
Note: Data source: Minryoku, edited by Asahi Shinbunsha. 
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a) High alcohol consumption region 
 
 
b) Low alcohol consumption region 
 
Fig 3. Relationship between monthly household cigarette expenditures and alcohol 
consumption for high alcohol consumption and low alcohol consumption areas. 
 
Note: The log form of annual alcohol and cigarettes consumption (millions of yen) was 
applied.  
Source: Data collected from Minryoku, edited by Asahi Shinbunsha.  
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    TABLE 1 
Variable definitions, means, and standard deviations. 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
CIGA 
 
Cigarette expenditure a 9,370 12,909 
PRIC Cigarette price (Yen) 
 
227.2 13.9 
DENS Density of population(number of population 
per km2) 
623 1,060 
SN1 
 
Number of public baths 547 525 
SN2  Number of community centers 
 
377 277 
DSN1 
 
Number of population turnovers within 
prefecture b 
72.1 86.1 
DSN2 
 
Number of immigrants from other 
prefectures b 
64.0 79.9 
INCOM Regional real income a 
 
8,228 9,297 
ALCOL Alcohol consumption a 41.9 41.9 
 
SERVI 
 
Number of employments of service sector b 834.0 867.3 
CAR 
 
Number of cars b  142.8 122.2 
POP Total population b 2,645 2,387 
 
Notes:   a In Millions of Yen.   
b In 1000s. 
Values are the simple averages of the yearly values over the period 1988-2001. Data 
source is Minryoku edited by Asahi Shinbunsha. 
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                      TABLE 2   Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA 
ALL 
(2)  CIGA 
  HALCOL 
(3) CIGA 
LALCOL 
(4) CIGA 
ALL 
(5) CIGA 
 HALCOL 
(6) CIGA 
LALCOL 
CIGA-1 0.12** 
(2.98) 
0.15** 
(2.76) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(1.60) 
0.10* 
(1.81) 
-0.02 
(-0.41) 
PRIC 
 
-30.0*107 
(-0.14) 
-135.3 
(-0.38) 
74.1 
(0.98) 
-51.6 
(-0.25) 
-35.1 
(-0.10) 
92.6 
(1.24) 
DENS 
 
-63.3*107 
(-1.24) 
-62.1 
(-0.90) 
-129.6 
(-1.39) 
-95.7* 
(-1.92) 
-72.8 
(-1.07) 
-192.4* 
(-2.18) 
SN1 -1.86 
(-0.25) 
6.08 
(0.63) 
-2.67 
(-0.44) 
-26.1** 
(-4.18) 
-20.1** 
(-2.48) 
-1.22 
(-0.21) 
SN2 -7.58 
(-0.65) 
-63.3* 
(-2.16) 
0.24 
(0.09) 
-4.23 
(-0.37) 
-71.4** 
(-2.49) 
-0.38 
(-0.15) 
DSN1 190.1** 
(4.01) 
173.9** 
(2.61) 
-138.2 
(-1.44) 
126.6** 
(2.80) 
118.1* 
(1.83) 
-135.3 
(-1.43) 
DSN2 
 
230.7** 
(3.85) 
224.9** 
(2.91) 
-98.7 
(-1.14) 
144.9** 
(2.53) 
138.1* 
(1.88) 
-130.7 
(-1.55) 
ALCOL 
 
224.9** 
(6.14) 
251.2** 
(4.79) 
-30.9 
(-1.32) 
194.2** 
(5.48) 
198.4** 
(3.95) 
-19.2 
(-0.85) 
INCOM 
 
-2.13** 
(-3.75) 
-1.44* 
(-1.93) 
-1.00 
(-1.02) 
-4.00** 
(-8.50) 
-3.02** 
(-4.65) 
-1.99* 
(-2.29) 
SERVIC 
 
-141.4** 
(-12.9) 
-129.2** 
(-8.51) 
-43.0** 
(-3.08) 
-145.3** 
(-13.6) 
-130.2** 
(-8.74) 
-38.1** 
(-2.79) 
CAR 
 
-128.5** 
(-6.19) 
-140.6** 
(-4.71) 
-67.8* 
(-2.27) 
   
POP 
 
96.6** 
(4.67) 
86.3** 
(3.06) 
47.1* 
(1.68) 
125.9** 
(6.37) 
105.2** 
(3.82) 
65.0** 
(2.41) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=0.55 
p-value=0.58 
Z=0.15 
p-value=0.88 
Z=1.61 
p-value=0.10 
Z=0.84 
p-value=0.40 
Z=0.83 
p-value=0.40 
Z=1.18 
p-value=0.23 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
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TABLE 3.  Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA 
ALL 
(2)  CIGA 
  HALCOL 
(3) CIGA 
LALCOL 
(4) CIGA 
ALL 
(5) CIGA 
 HALCOL 
(6) CIGA 
LALCOL 
CIGA-1 0.11** 
(2.63) 
0.15** 
(2.54) 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
0.06 
(1.61) 
0.11* 
(1.95) 
-0.02 
(-0.35) 
PRIC 
 
-61.1 
(-0.28) 
-179.5 
(-0.48) 
23.3 
(0.31) 
-52.0 
(-0.25) 
-70.1 
(-0.19) 
40.2 
(0.54) 
DENS 
 
-91.5* 
(-1.75) 
-87.2 
(-1.20) 
-89.9 
(-0.97) 
-128.8** 
(-2.53) 
-104.8 
(-1.47) 
-143.9* 
(-1.66) 
SN1 -11.2 
(-1.53) 
-6.63 
(-0.69) 
-2.45 
(-0.40) 
-34.3** 
(-5.42) 
-29.1** 
(-3.54) 
-1.40 
(-0.24) 
SN2 -6.94 
(-0.58) 
-56.3* 
(-1.84) 
0.81 
(-0.31) 
-4.24 
(-0.36) 
-64.5* 
(-2.16) 
-1.26 
(-0.49) 
DSN1 163.1** 
(3.30) 
121.3* 
(1.73) 
-173.1* 
(-1.81) 
87.6* 
(1.87) 
60.9 
(0.91) 
-168.1* 
(-1.77) 
DSN2 
 
215.5** 
(3.49) 
198.4** 
(2.47) 
-96.1 
(-1.11) 
127.9* 
(2.17) 
118.1 
(1.54) 
-123.5 
(-1.47) 
ALCOL-1 
 
168.5** 
(4.07) 
144.6** 
(2.39) 
37.6 
(1.56) 
107.7** 
(2.74) 
68.3 
(1.21) 
43.1* 
(1.83) 
INCOM 
 
-1.91** 
(-3.21) 
-1.31* 
(-1.65) 
-1.03 
(-1.06) 
-3.90** 
(-8.02) 
-2.88** 
(-4.25) 
-1.80* 
(-2.06) 
SERVIC 
 
-153.2** 
(-13.8) 
-140.8** 
(-8.93) 
-40.8** 
(-2.93) 
-155.3** 
(-14.3) 
-138.7** 
(-8.97) 
-36.8** 
(-2.69) 
CAR 
 
-132.5** 
(-6.05) 
-133.1** 
(-4.20) 
-52.1* 
(-1.78) 
   
POP 
 
117.1** 
(5.61) 
109.4** 
(3.72) 
33.8 
(1.21) 
149.5** 
(7.54) 
130.1** 
(4.57) 
48.8* 
(1.82) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=0.86 
p-value=0.39 
Z=0.35 
p-value=0.72 
Z=1.32 
p-value=0.18 
Z=0.44 
p-value=0.66 
Z=0.48 
p-value=0.62 
Z=0.95 
p-value=0.34 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
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TABLE  4.  Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA (2)  CIGA# (3) CIGA (4)  CIGA# 
CIGA-1 0.05 
(1.31) 
0.03 
(0.92) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
-0.02 
(0.72) 
PRIC 
 
-42.7 
(-0.02) 
-30.2 
(-0.16) 
-8.54 
(-0.04) 
-43.8 
(-0.23) 
ALCOL 
 
-37.3 
(-0.32) 
-29.3 
(-0.27) 
193.0* 
(1.79) 
149.1 
(1.48) 
DENS* 
ALCOL 
-0.15** 
(-6.46) 
-0.15** 
(-6.30) 
-0.11** 
(-5.15) 
-0.11** 
(-4.91) 
SN1* 
ALCOL 
0.10* 
(2.05) 
0.08* 
(1.80) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
SN2* 
ALCOL 
-0.28 
(-1.43) 
-0.26 
(-1.48) 
-0.58** 
(-3.06) 
-0.45** 
(-2.62) 
DSN1* 
ALCOL 
2.07** 
(6.68) 
1.94** 
(6.36) 
2.15** 
(7.14) 
2.00** 
(6.75) 
DSN2* 
ALCOL 
0.63* 
(2.14) 
0.79** 
(2.80) 
0.40 
(1.43) 
0.64** 
(2.36) 
INCOM 
 
-2.76** 
(-4.99) 
-2.65** 
(-4.84) 
-4.61** 
(-9.94) 
-4.60** 
(-10.0) 
SERVIC 
 
-137.2** 
(-13.3) 
-139.6** 
(-13.8) 
-134.4** 
(-13.4) 
-134.3** 
(-13.7) 
CAR 
 
-126.8** 
(-6.76) 
-127.2** 
(-6.97) 
  
POP 
 
68.8** 
(7.49) 
62.7** 
(7.31) 
83.1** 
(9.54) 
74.2** 
(9.02) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=0.50 
p-value=0.61 
Z=-0.63 
p-value=0.53 
Z=2.07 
p-value=0.03 
Z=-2.24 
p-value=0.02 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
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Table 5.  Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA (2)  CIGA# (3) CIGA (4)  CIGA# 
CIGA-1 0.03 
(0.77) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(-0.11) 
PRIC 
 
62.9 
(0.30) 
39.6 
(0.20) 
136.2 
(0.67) 
60.3 
(0.30) 
ALCOL-1 
 
-217.9* 
(-1.81) 
-222.4* 
(-1.97) 
94.7 
(0.84) 
41.7 
(0.39) 
DENS* 
ALCOL-1 
-0.16** 
(-5.95) 
-0.16** 
(-5.75) 
-0.11** 
(-4.07) 
-0.09** 
(-3.72) 
SN1* 
ALCOL-1 
0.03 
(0.79) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
-0.14** 
(-3.74) 
-0.16** 
(-4.25) 
SN2* 
ALCOL-1 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.07 
(0.39) 
-0.25 
(-1.19) 
-0.09 
(-0.50) 
DSN1* 
ALCOL-1 
2.41** 
(7.09) 
2.21** 
(6.66) 
2.20** 
(6.64) 
1.96** 
(6.07) 
DSN2* 
ALCOL-1 
1.06** 
(3.14) 
1.32** 
(4.08) 
0.36 
(1.13) 
0.67* 
(2.17) 
INCOM 
 
-1.69** 
(-2.92) 
-1.56** 
(-2.71) 
-4.34** 
(-8.89) 
-4.35** 
(-9.03) 
SERVIC 
 
-155.0** 
(-15.0) 
-158.0** 
(-15.5) 
-150.8** 
(-14.9) 
-151.4** 
(-15.3) 
CAR 
 
-184.5** 
(-8.59) 
-187.7** 
(-8.96) 
  
POP 
 
75.9** 
(8.06) 
68.4** 
(7.65) 
104.9** 
(12.1) 
95.9** 
(11.5) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=1.05 
p-value=0.29 
Z=-0.91 
p-value=0.36 
Z=1.13 
p-value=0.25 
Z=1.30 
p-value=0.19 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
